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Representation, bargaining and the law:
where next for the unions?*
DR MICHAEL DOHERTY
Lecturer in Law, School of Law and Government/Socio-legal Research
Centre, Dublin City University
Introduction
T he right to freedom of association and the right of trade unions to bargain on behalf
of workers are rights that have long been internationally recognised. This can be seen
in international law instruments such as the International Labour Organisation's (ILO)
Convention No 87 of 1948, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention and, under European law, in the shape of Article 28 of the European
Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 11 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The right to freedom of association
is also protected by Article 40.1.6(iii) of the Irish Constitution. However, as Hogan and
Whyte point out, as interpreted by the Irish Supreme Court, this does not imply any duty
on the employer beyond respecting the right in itself; in particular, "it does not oblige him
to negotiate with any association which employees may form" I
This constitutional position reflects the fact that trade union bargaining rights in
Ireland, as in the UK, have traditionally been premised on the notion of "voluntarism", i.e.
the avoidance of statutory regulation. 2 The position in Ireland remains, however, unique
in the Western world in that Irish trade unions havc no legislative right to be recognised in
the workplace for collective bargaining purposes.3 This article considers a recent attempt,
in the form of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-21)04 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Acts"), to address this situation. This research looked at the perceived
effectiveness of the legislation from the point of view of the various employment relations
stakeholders (unions, employees, employers and the state's industrial relations bodies), by
way of a detailed cxamination of the day-to-day operation of the Acts by the Labour
I would like to express pround thanks both to the anonymous rcvicwcr and to \nthonv Kerr of Unicrsiv
College Dublin fi,r the insightful and helpful comments received. 1 would also lIke t,, thank my colleaguc, in
the Socio-l'cgal Rescarch Centre at DCU, particularly Dr Noelle f liggins. Many thanks, to,,, to Sinead Ring
(L1( ( ) tor her work in helping compile the data.
I G, Hogan and G \WN te, Kel#. The Irisb Conshlition 4th edn (Dublin: Butterxorth 210)3), p. 1M6.
2 ' Kerr and G \Vhyte, Irib Trade Uion Lin (Dublin: Butterworth 1985).
3 Twice, In 1967 and again in 1996, groups charged with reviewing the Consnrution have osidered "hether a
constitutional amendment was necessarx in the area of freedom of .iss cation. In both cases,, the viex
expressed was that this matter would be best dealt with by lciqslarmn; see Report o/ me Coi,,rntee on the
coosilutio, (1967) and Report of the Conshtution Reiieu Groop (1996). A statutory procedure f,,r v.inmg
rcooiinion nghts now exist, in the UK; see the Employment Relations Act 1999.
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Court, from their coming into operation in June 2001 to the immediate aftermath of the
decision of the Irish Supreme Court in the Ryanair case,4 vk-hich, as we will see, led many
commentators to proclaim the legislation effectively neutered.5 The article questions
whether the Acts can, despite the pessimism of many commentators, still play a role in
Irish industrial relations (IR).
However, more broadly, the Acts represented an innovative attempt to steer a "half-way
house" course between legally mandated collective bargaining and voluntarism. As a result,
the article will also consider some possible implications of the "Irish model" for IR in other
European jurisdictions, particularly in the light of recent developments concerning
collective bargaining rights at EU level.
The article is laid out as follows. In the next section, the legislation and the decision in
Ryanair will be outlined in more detail. Then, the methodology used in the analysis will be
explained. The implications of the Ryanair decision will then be considered in light of the
empirical evidence relating to the interpretation of the Acts. Finally, some implications of
the Acts for industrial relations practice and collective bargaining more generally (in Ireland
and elsewhere) will be teased out.
The Industrial Relations Acts 2001 -2004
The absence of any statutory protection for collective bargaining became progressively
more of a concern for the Irish trade union movement in the 1990s. This was partly because
the decline in union density (the proportion of workers who are members of a trade union)
became increasingly pronounced and partly as a result of a change in state policy in the
1980s, where state industrial development agencies began "marketing" Ireland (particularly
to US multinational corporations (MNCs)) as a non-union environment. 6 The unions'
dissatisfaction was arguably compounded by the participation since 1987 of the Irish
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) in the social partnership process, which has given the
union movement a key institutional role at national level in relation to socio-economic
policy, while at workplace level unions have no such institutional security and must fight
recalcitrant employers for recognition rights.
As a result, the union movement pushed for progress on recognition rights for unions
at workplace level. 7 Under the fourth of the social partnership agreements, Partnership 2000,
a high-level group comprising union and employer representatives and industrial relations
experts was set up to examine the issue of trade union recognition rights. 8 The result was
the drawing up of the Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution 9 and the
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001. The Code of Practice and the 2001 Act
explicitly exclude the imposition of any "arrangements for collective bargaining", on the
grounds of protecting Ireland's voluntarist tradition. The general philosophy behind both
4 R'anair v The Labour Court [20071 4 IR 199.
5 M Connolly, "Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 - imphcations for industrial relations
law and practice of the Supreme Court Decision in Ryanmar v Labour Court and LIPACT' (2007) 4 IELJ 37;
NI Dohert. "'Union sundown? The future of collective representation rights in Irish law" (20107) 4 IELJ 96;
cf. A Kerr, "Industrial re ations law" in NI Regan (ed.), Emzplqymtent Law (Dublin: Tottel 2008).
6 Scc I \\allace et al., Industrial Relations in Ireland (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan 2004); T V Roche, "Pay
determination, the state and the politics of indusral relations" in W K Nurphy and T V Roche (eds), Irish
Industrial Relations in Practie (Cork: Oak Tree Press 1997).
7 Particularlh in the light of a bitter and high protile 1998 union recognition dispute at the airline company,
Ryaniatr.
8 .cc para. 9.22 of Partnership 2000.
9 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Voluntar' Dispute Resoluton) (Declaration) Order 2wfl
(SI No 145 of 2000).
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is that disputes relating to union recognition should be dealt with within the context of
voluntary collective bargaining (with parties offered recourse to the advisory and
conciliation services of the Labour Relations Commission (LRC)). Thus, the 2001 Act does
not provide for union recognition, but for a range of procedures to allow unions to seek to
have specific disputes with regard to pay, terms and conditions of employment and dispute
resolution procedures addressed. 10 The provisions of the Act are used as a fallback measure
whereby, in a situation where the parties cannot come to agreement under the "voluntary
leg" of the process, a union or excepted body1 1 may request a further investigation by the
Labour Court, which can issue a Recommendation.1 2 Should the issue remain unresolved,
the court has the power to issue a legally binding Determination on pay and terms of
employment. If the employer does not comply with a Labour Court Determination, the
trade union may apply to the Circuit Court for an order directing the employer to carry out
the Determination in accordance with its terms.
Changes to the legislation were agreed under the Sustaining Progress partnership
agreement1 3 and resulted in the passing of the Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 2004. SI No 145 was repealed and replaced by the Industrial Relations Act
1990 (Enhanced Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution) (Declaration) Order
2004.14 The 2004 Act provided that the processing of disputes under the Voluntary Dispute
Resolution Code should take place within an indicative overall time frame of 26 weeks, with
the possibility of extending it to a maximum of 34 weeks. Under the legislation, therefore, an
employer may be compelled to grant union representatives the right to represent unionised
employees on workplace issues relating to pay and terms and conditions of employment, but
cannot be forced to make arrangements for collective bargaining.
Fasten your seatbelts - the Ryanair case
Trade unions had clearly hoped to use this legislation as a "springboard" to greater
recognition rights,15 but such aspirations appear to have been dashed given the decision in
Ryanair v The Labour Court.16 There, the Supreme Court upheld the company's complaints
against the Labour Court's operation of the legislation, basing the decision on two key
factors. First, the Supreme Court was highly critical of the procedures adopted by the Labour
Court in hearing claims under the legislation. In particular, the Supreme Court felt that
employees on behalf of whom claims were taken should ideally give oral evidence. The
court held that the Labour Court did not adopt fair procedures by permitting complete
non-disclosure of the identity of the persons on whose behalf the union was purporting to
act. Furthermore, and most controversiall; the Supreme Court criticised what it referred to
as the Labour Court's "mindset", which favoured the wvay particular expressions are used
10 C Ryan, "Leaving it to the experts - in the matter of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001" (2006)
3 IELJ 118.
11 "Excepted body" is defined by s. 6(3)(h) of the Trade Union Act 1941 (as inserted b\ s. 2 of the Trade Union
Act 1942) and refers to "a body all the members of which are employed by the same employer and which
carries on negotiations for the fixing of wages or other conditions of employment of its own members (but
no other employ ees)"
12 Note the "Labour Court" is not part of the formal courts system but is a specialy established industrial
relations tribunal set up under the Industrial Relations Act 1946 to provide fair, informal and inexpensive
arrangements for the adjudicanon and resoluton ,f trade disputes.
13 'scc Art. 8.9 of Sustamig Progress.
14 S1 No 176 of 2004.
15 B Sheehan, tmplocrs and the traditional industrial relations system: how the bonds have been loosened' in
T I lastings (ed.), The Sate of the U;nons (Dublin: Liffey Press 2008).
16 120071 4 IR 199
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and particular activities are carried out by trade unions and which hinted that collective
bargaining in a non-unionised company must take the same form and adopt the same
procedures as would apply in collective bargaining with a trade union. This is somew\vhat
surprising, as the Superior Courts have traditionally been quite deferential to the Labour
Court's expertise in relation to industrial affairs. In the Ryanair case itself, Hanna J in the
High Court17 had endorsed this view:
The Labour Court is very much in charge of its own procedures. It has provided
over many years a vital and invaluable service to the State in the often fraught
area of industrial relations. It is not a court of law and the practice and procedure
which it has evolved over the years, understandably, necessarily involved pursuing
a less ritualistic and formalistic path than might be the case before these courts.
In fact, Hanna J pointed out, the present case was somewhat noteworthy in that lawyers did
attend on behalf of the applicant. The Supreme Court's criticism of the procedures
adopted by the Labour Court will likely have the effect of encouraging a greater formality
in respect of Labour Court hearings and perhaps encourage a further "juridificiation"
of the process. 18
Secondly, the Supreme Court ruled that the Labour Court had erred in law (due partially
to this "mindset") in its interpretation of the legislation; in particular, in deciding what wvas
meant by the "practice" of "collective bargaining", in assessing when "internal procedures"
had been exhausted, and in deciding what constituted an "excepted body" Essentially, the
Supreme Court was not satisfied that the Labour Court was correctly confirming its
jurisdiction to hear claims under s. 2 of the 2001 Act. As we will see, the number of claims
processed under the 2001-2004 Acts has fallen dramatically in the wake of the decision.
The sample and method
This study looked at 103 Labour Court hearings up to, and including, the end of 2007,
which were reported on the Labour Court website. 19 Two hearings were reported in 2002;
10 in 2003; 20 in 2004; 31 in 2005; 31 in 2006; and 9 in 2007. It should be noted that 89 of
these hearings (86 per cent of the total) were heard after the amendments introduced by the
2004 Act came into effect in April 2004. Eighty-nine different employers featured in the 103
hearings. 20 If one looks at the occupational characteristics of the groups of employees
involved in the cases, five sectors (using the Central Statistics Office (CSO) classification) 2 1
accounted for the bulk of the cases; manufacturing industry; transport, storage and
communication; wholesale and retail; real estate, renting and business activities (including
security services); and community social and personal service activities (excluding health
and education). When looked at in detail, the cases are almost exclusively taken in respect
of relatively low-pay, low-skill groups of workers.
22
SLxt-four of the employers involved in the hearings (72 per cent) were indigenous
organisations, while 25 (28 per cent) were Irish subsidiaries of foreign-owned MNCs. It was
not possible in all cases to establish the size of the workforces involved. HowevcCr, of the
76 cases in which this information wvas ascertained, in 15 of the cases (20 per cent) the
company employed fewer than 20 persons, in 35 cases (46 per cent) between 20 and 100
17 120061 ELR 1, at p. 17. Sce also the )udgment of Clarke J in Ashford Castle v SIPTU 120071 4 IR 70.
18 J Browne, The J]ridification qf the Erp/oc)'ent Relationship (Aldershot: Aveburv 1994).
19 xxw labourcourt.ie. just two hearings "ere held in 2008. There were no hearings in 2109.
21) Some employers participated in multiple hearings (discussed further below).
21 See w lsx, csoie/statistcs/LabourForce. htm.
22 Although there are a nirmted number of exceptons; the airline pilots in the R nln case, t tor example.
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persons and in 26 cases (34 per cent) over 100 persons. Thus, the majority of cases involved
relatively large employers, most of which were indigenous.
Of the 93 hearings where substantive issues were considered (i.e. excluding preliminary
hearings under s. 2(1) of the 2001 Act discussed in the next section), binding
Determinations under s. 6(1) were made in 26 cases (28 per cent). In 19 cases the
Determination confirmed the original Recommendation in full and in seven cases it
confirmed the Recommendation in part.
23
A random sample of 48 hearings (47 per cent of the total) was chosen for more in-
depth analysis.24 Remuneration 25 was at issue in 41 of the hearings. Grievance and
disciplinary issues were at issue in 30 hearings. Of the latter, 21 specifically involved the
situation where an employee or group of employees were seeking to be represented by a
trade union representative in respect of grievance and/or disciplinary proceedings. Non-
pay benefits (e.g. canteen facilities) were at issue in 11 cases, leave entitlements in 10,
working hours and employer failure to comply with statutory obligations both featured in
six cases with assorted "other" issues featuring in a further 17 cases. 26 Thus, the issues
raised involve traditional "core" union issues; pay and conditions and
protection/representation in respect of grievances and disciplinary matters. Very few issues
raised related to more "qualitative" issues (for example, family-friendly working).
The Ryanair decision: procedures
CONFIRMING PRELIMINARY JURISDICTION
Under s. 2(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 20)01 (as amended) the
Labour Court may investigate a trade dispute where it is satisfied that:
it is not the practice of the employer to engage in collective bargaining
negotiations in respect of the grade, group or category of workers who are party
to the trade dispute and the internal dispute resolution procedures (if any)
normally used by the parties concerned have failed to resolve the dispute.
Under s. 3 of the 2001 Act (as amended), any question as to whether the requirements
specified in s. 2 have been met may, as the court considers appropriate, be determined either
by way of a hearing preliminary to the court's investigation under that section, or as part of
that investigation.
Of the 103 Labour Court hearings held prior to 2008, just 10 ere preliminary hearings
under s. 2, where the court did not discuss the substantive issues but considered only its
jurisdiction to hear the union's claim. Of the 10, the court confirmed its jurisdiction in six
cases and found it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case in the remaining four cases.
Of the 48 cases chosen for closer analysis, the employer made arguments contesting the
Labour Court's jurisdiction to hear the claim in 20 cases. In four cases, the emploNer made
submissions questioning the union's claim to represent employees; in six cases the company
23 S. 6 specifies that Determranrons should be in the same terms as an Recommendation made under s 5.
unless the court agrees a variation wvith the parties, or the court decides that the Recommendation, in whle
,,r in part, was grounded on unsound or incomplete informanon.
24 Of these, in three cases there was no discussion of the substantive issues, is onlh the court's lunsdiction to
hear the case was considered. As three of the hearings featuring Ashford C astle all involved the same issues,
a sample of 43 cases involving distinct substantive issues %Las examined. The sample was random, except in
the sense that, where a particular employer was involved in multple hearings, all of these \xcre xamined.
25 \Vhich here is taken to mean basic salari as well as issues like shift pay, overtime and sick pay.
2 6 For example, bulking and harassment, dignity at work; ne case 4i victirsation on the grounds of trade
uniion membership was raised.
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argued that internal procedures had not been exhausted; in three cases the employer argued
that no trade dispute existed; in four cases the employer argued that it did, in fact, engage in
collective bargaining with the relevant workers; in two cases the company argued that it
engaged in collective bargaining with a different union to that taking the claim; and in one
case the company claimed the union had engaged in industrial action (in breach of the Acts).
Overall, in the sample of 48 cases, the court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear claims in
42 (including three preliminary hearings). In the six cases where the court decided it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the claim, it found in three cases that the employer did engage in
collective bargaining, but with a union other than that taking the claim. 27 In three further
cases, the court found that internal procedures had not been exhausted. 28
In Ryanair, the Supreme Court was critical of the Labour Court in respect of its failure
adequately to address the issue of preliminary jurisdiction. The small number of stand-
alone preliminary hearings held demonstrates that, in the vast majority of cases where
jurisdiction was contested, the issue was decided by the Labour Court as part of the
substantive investigation. In the light of Ryanair, it is likely more preliminary hearings will
be necessary in future cases, as the preliminary examination would need to be more
thorough and more formal procedures would need to be employed. This, of course, will
have time and cost implications. Also, given the restrictive interpretations applied to key
elements of s 2. of the 2001 Act in Ryanair (analysed below), it is likely more cases would
emerge in which jurisdiction was not confirmed. This can already be seen in Bell Seuriy. 29
IDENTITY OF UNION MEMBERS AND REPRESENTATION
The Supreme Court in Rjanair held that the Labour Court did not adopt fair procedures
by permitting complete non-disclosure of the identity of the persons on whose behalf
the union was purporting to act. This aspect of the decision has led to a concern that,
fearing victimisation from employers displaying a Ryanair-like aversion to trade unions,
many employees would be likely to be discouraged from pursuing claims under the
legislation.30 The issue had arisen before the Labour Court, which decided in Genesis
Group31 that the legislation:
does not require a trade union or excepted body to disclose the names or
other identifying details of its members as . condition precedent to the making
of an application.
The Supreme Court, however, seemed to view the issue of disclosure as a fundamental
aspect of fair procedures. It is interesting that, in the immediate aftermath of the Ryanair
decision, the LRC issued a press release, stating that, in its view, the verification of union
27 Feraley, lirport Services (Case LCR18845 issued on 26/2/2007); Federal Seltov' Services (Case LCRI8621 issued
on 4/07/2006); and 11C1 Selrt't), (Case LCR18206 issued on 26/05/2005).
28 See. for example, Bata Global Turnkey (Case DECP041 issued on 13/07/2004).
29 Case LCR19188 issued on 11/04/2008 discussed below at p. 3 95 .
30 This point is particularlv pertinent in the light of Gearv's research, which showed that the propensin
" 
to
unionise in non-union workplaccs is especially manifest in situations where employcrs offer their support fir
union representaion; the propensity to unionise drops markedly in situations where emplmcrs are not
prepared to support union organisanon. Scc J Geary, "Employee voice in the Irish workplace: .[atus and
prospect" in P lioxall et al. (eds). II-hat I1srkers Sat." Em'plsee roice in the Anglo-Anlenai lr (Ithaca:
Cornell UP 2007). it should be noted that there are anti-victimisation procedures under the Acts (ss. 8 and 9
f the 2004 Act), which have rarelh been used.
31 Case DIR0511 issued on 22/9/2005. \ote, however, that the Labour Court restricted the application ,t it,
decision to the members ,f the union. "hercforc. although the union did not have tr disclose its member,hip
rS a condition of making the applicanon. it so (uld have t, disclose in order to benefit trim the decision.
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members at the LRC stage of the process (at the request of employers) was in accordance
with the Supreme Court's ruling:
this was done in a very straightforward way by the Advisory Officer obtaining a
list of members from the trade union and cross checking this against the
employer's own data such as payroll... our advice is that, while we must satisfy
ourselves that the trade union has members in the employment concerned, the
judgement does not oblige us to compel a trade union to disclose to employers
the names of those taken into membership.
32
A related area of controversy is the extent to which unions taking claims under the
legislation are, in fact, representative. In 78 of the 103 hearings (76 per cent) no information
can be gleaned from the Labour Court report as to the number of members the union in
question claimed to have in membership. In the other 24 cases, the number of members
claimed varies significantly. In Castle T Furniture,33 for example, SIPTU (Services Industrial
Professional and Technical Union) claimed to represent half of the 18 employees in the
company, while in Schering Plolgh34 the union claimed to represent 306 of the 700 employees
at the company plant. At the other end of the scale, in QK Cold Stores3 5 the union's claim
was on behalf of just seven employees out of a workforce of over 100, while, in Finlay
Breton,36 BATU's (Building and Allied Trade Union) claim was in respect of three members
out of a workforce of 300. Thus, in some cases the unions involved pursued a claim where
they declared to have a considerable existing presence, while in others claims were taken on
behalf of a handful of employees only.
In three of the 48 cases chosen for closer analysis, the employer explicitly challenged
before the Labour Court how representative the unions in question were.37 In Goode
Concrete,38 the company contended that the union was not actuallY representative of an) of
its employees and that there could not, therefore, be a dispute between it and the union. The
union claimed to represent 30 drivers and offered to provide the court, on a confidential
basis, with details concerning the number and identit- of company employees who had
joined the union, as the members did not consent to their identity being disclosed to their
employer for reasons outlined to the court. The court noted that the \cts do not prescribe
any membership threshold which a trade union must meet before it can bring an application
under s. 2(1) and accepted the assurances of the union that it was representative of
employees in dispute with the compan.
The issue of verifying to what extent a union is representative of workers in dispute is
now paramount in the light of R'anair. Unions are, and have been, reluctant publicly to
divulge information about membership levels in non-union companies for fear this may
lead to employees being identified by employers and, potentially, being victimised or
disadvantaged. The Supreme Court decision goes beyond this by' explicitly requiring some
identification of individualemployees in dispute. This is so even though, as the Labour Court
32 w\%N, w rc.ie/ viwdoc.asp?Docid =555&Catid =28&Star rDate- I +J anuary+2008&m= n.
33 Case ICR19002 issued on 01/10/2007.
)4 ( asc 1CR18226 issued on 15/06/2'5.
35 (Cas I. CR18556 issued on 10/05/2006.
36 Case ICR 062 issued on 6/04/2006.
37 tli//rew u\ng, Home (Case ICR 18271 issued on 29/)7/2005> Analog Devices I Lc 1.CR18137 issued on
21/f3/2005); and Goode Cotrmle (Case 1.CR18037 issued on 09/12/2004).
38 Goode C(',re (Case I.CRIS1037 issued on 09 '12 2004)
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has pointed out, there is no requirement under the legislation for unions to meet any
representation threshold prior to taking a claim.39
This is a real problem for unions, not only as many (most?) members will likely be
unwilling to put their heads above the parapet in pursuing a claim under the legislation,
but also more broadly in the sense that evidence has shown that, in the absence of
employer support, many Irish workers are fearful of the consequences of joining unions
at all lest union membership damage their career prospects.40 In this sense, there may be
some conflict between the position following the Supreme Court decision and Irelands
obligations under Article 11 of the ECHR. It should be remembered that in the Wilson and
Palmer case 41 the European Court of Human Rights found that "employees should be free
to instruct or permit their union to make representations to their employer or to take
action in support of their interests". 42 The court went on to say that if workers were
prevented from so doing, their freedom to belong to a trade union became illusory and
that it was the "role of the State to ensure that trade union members were not prevented
or restrained from using their union to represent them in attempts to regulate their
relations with their employers". 43
In relation to the issue of identifiable union members giving evidence, one solution
might be for some number of employees, on whose behalf the union is acting, to swear
affidavits which would be supplied to the Labour Court. The court, having verified that the
employees are union members and work for the company (in a manner similar to that
outlined by the LRC above), could then supply anonymous versions of these to the
employer. This, however, would run into another procedural issue identified by the Supreme
Court that relates to oral evidence (discussed in the next section).
A second way out of the identification issue might be to re-fashion s. 2(1) altogether.
Instead of fulfilling the criteria presently laid down in order to take a claim, a union could
be required to meet some specified threshold of membership (which, again, could be
verified by the LRC or Labour Court). This wvould have the advantage for employers of
their not being subject to the legislation where only a handful of workers arc union
members. 44 There is some recent precedence for this type of arrangement, too, in the
Employee (Provision of Information and Consultation) Act 2006, which requires
cmployers to inform and consult with employee representatives on a range of issues, where
such a request is made by at least 10 per cent of the workforce. 4 5 For the unions, where
such a threshold was met, this approach would give "moral legitimacy" to their claims. This,
39 This idea of pressure on unions to disclose to courts and tribunals sensitive information regarding
membership has interesting parallels Aith the vie%% posited by some that the result of the ECJ's decisions in
cases like [ "Ling could well be that unions, in order to defend the proportionahty of industrial action in claims
relating to FU frcc movement rights, could be forced to disclose to national courts and tribunals potentially
oppressive volumnes of materials on internal union strategy, tactics and poicy; see K L_ ing and J Hiendy, "Trh
FIC[ decisions and trade union freedom: lessons from the L K" in K Ewing and J Ilendly (eds). The N\ew Spectre
Hauilnng Europe- The ECJ, trade unio, eights aud the British goverrmentt (livcrp : Institute if Employment Right,
2009). Case C-438/05 Intenrational Transport ll'orkxrs' Federaton and Firnish Seanlen Umion v I 'king Line ABP
[20081 IRLR 14 See further belsm. at 398.
40 Gcar', "Elmployee v.cc", n. 30 above.
41 113ison & the NI], Paler, c Others v The UK [20021 IIILR 128.
42 Ibid., at para 4(6 (emphasis added).
43 Ibid.
14 As in Finlay Breton, - 36 above.
4 "hc 2006 Act implements Directisv 2002 14 FC of II March 2002 establishing a general framework fi r
informing and consulting employees in the Furopean Community 0)' 1.80/29) scc NI I)ohern%; "It's g,-id to
talk ... isn't tt; I cgislating for information and consultation in the Irish wosrkplace" (21008) 15 DULJ 120
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in fact, would not be a million miles from the position pre-2001, where unions took
recognition claims under s. 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1969. Recommendations
under the 1969 Act that the employer should recognise the union in respect of those
workers it had in membership were not binding on the employer and were often ignored.
46
However, such a Recommendation still allowed a union taking industrial action in support
of recognition to show that it had done its best to abide by procedures. Under the
2001-2004 Acts, of course, an\ Recommendation would not relate to union recognition,
but would be binding.
Whether this would satisfy the unions is another question. As noted, the unions may
have seen the legislation as a potential "springboard" to full recognition rights in companies.
To meet a threshold unions would need to build up substantial support in a company prior
to making a claim (a problem that has bedevilled British unions attempting to invoke the
statutory recognition procedure there),47 whereas, under the present s. 2(1) they can invoke
the legislation on behalf of any number of members, however small. Success can then
result in a beneficial "demonstration" effect to other employees and help unions to garner
more members. Similarly, from an employee's point of view, the purpose of the legislation,
as outlined by Geoghegan J in Ryanair, was to protect employees in non-unionised
companies from the obvious danger that: "employees may be exploited and may have to
submit to what most reasonable people would consider to be grossly unfair terms and
conditions of employment". 48
One of the objectives of the Acts was to permit a right to representation for individual
union members in the face of their employer's opposition. Because such employees, as
individuals, normally have little bargaining power, the Acts accorded with arguably the main
object of labour law; to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining
inherent in the relationship, concealed by that "indispensable figment of the legal mind, the
contract of employment". 49
ORAL EVIDENCE
A final procedural issue raised by the Supreme Court related to oral evidence. The court
felt that factual issues in dispute should be resolved on oral evidence from parties who
participated in the process or who could give first-hand evidence on how the employer's
procedures operated.50 Therefore, direct evidence on any issue is generally to be
preferred to a legal submission, or an opinion or references to documents unsupported
by direct evidence.
The reference here to an "opinion" is particularly worrying for the unions, as it relates
to the issues discussed in the previous section around employees giving direct evidence. In
order to protect employees' anonymity, the usual practice under the Acts has been for a
union official to outline the employee case. Indeed, of the sample of 48 cases looked at
here, in only one did an employee who was party to the dispute appear to give oral
evidence. 51 If direct evidence from those involved is to be preferred, this option will no
longer be enough. It is interesting to note in Ryanair that Hanna J, in the High Court, 2
46 C Higgins, The night to bargain law: is it working?" (2001) 45 IP'.
47 See further below at n. 98.
48 1200715 IR 99, at p. 215.
4) Kahn-Frcund, Libour and the L iw (London: Stevens & Sons 1977), 1p. 6.
50 Therefirc. the .uggetion re "anonymous affidavits- mo, red above would stcm to fill toul of this aspect of
the Supreme (ourt decision.
51 buhtt/e RtscalCnche (Case 1.CR18648 issued on 24/07/2006).
52 120061 ELR 1.
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pointed out that whether or not oral evidence is offered in a case is a call made on a daily
basis by advocates before the ordinary courts, where parties are free to offer viva voce
evidence or not as the case may be. He went on to observe that, while there might be
circumstances in which the Labour Court might take a more "activist role" in determining
what oral evidence it might wish to hear (for example, where there is a marked imbalance
of "firepower" in the representation of the parties before it), this was not such a case.
The Supreme Court decision: interpretation
The second limb of the Supreme Court's criticism in Ryanair related to the interpretation
given to key elements of the amended s. 2(1) of the 2001 Act by the Labour Court. For the
Labour Court to assert jurisdiction in such cases it must be satisfied that it is not the
"practice of the employer to engage in collective bargaining" with a trade union or an
excepted body. The view accepted by the Labour Court was that if a group of employees
unilaterally withdraws from the internal negotiating procedures, it could not thereafter be
said that the employer had a practice of engaging in collective bargaining with them. The
Labour Court laid down its definition of collective bargaining in the Ashford Castle53 case,
noting that the expression is not defined in industrial relations legislation and that it is not
a legal term of art:
Collective bargaining comprehends more than mere negotiation or consultation
on individual employment related issues, including the processes of individual
grievances in relation to pay or conditions of employment. In the industrial
relations context in which the term is commonlh used, it connotes a process b)
which employers or their representatives negotiate with representatives of a
group or body of workers for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement
fixing the pay and other conditions of employment applicable to the group of
workers on whose behalf the negotiations are conducted.
Normally the process is characterised by the involvement of a trade union
representing workers, but it may also be conducted by a staff association, which
is an excepted body within the meaning of the Trade Union Act 1941, as
amended. However an essential characteristic of collective bargaining, properly
so called, is that it is conducted between parties of equal standing, who are
independent in the sense that one is not controlled by the other.
The Supreme Court, however, objected to the x iew "arguably hinted at" in the definition
that collective bargaining in a non-unionised company must take the same form and adopt
the same procedures as would apply in collective bargaining with a trade union. The
Supreme Court criticised the Labour Court for acknowledging a special, trade union
meaning of the expression "collective bargaining negotiations" and held that the phrase
should be given simply an ordinary meaning and not any distinctive meaning as understood
in trade union negotiations. According to Geoghegan J:
if there is a machinery in Ryanair whereby the pilots may hav'e their own
independent representatives who sit around the table with representaivcs of
Rvanair with a view to reaching agreement, if possible, that would seem to be
"collective bargaining".
54
Furthermore, the unilateral withdrawal by employees from machinery put in place by the
employer would not of itself entitle the employees to assert that there was no collective
bargaining process in being; ultimately, where an employer has an intcrnal non-union
53 Case DI2 CPH32 issued on 19/11/2003.
54 [2007 4 1t 99, at p. 218.
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collective bargaining unit in place, this might constitute an excepted body under the
legislation and satisfy the requirements of s. 2.
The definition of collective bargaining provided by the Supreme Court and its
indication that a collective bargaining unit can, it seems, amount to any group of employees
as long as the group is recognised for this purpose by the company concerned have
provoked much comment. In Ashford Castle v SIPTU, Clarke J, in the High Court, noted that
the legislation:
only applies in circumstances where there is no collective bargaining. The only
reasonable inference to draw from that provision is that the intention of the
Oireachtas was to confer upon employees, who did not have the benefit of
collective bargaining, a means of attempting to achieve terms and conditions
comparable to those who had the benefit of collective bargaining.55
This was also the view underpinning the Labour Court's approach to the four
cases examined in this research where the employer argued that it did, in fact, engage in
collective bargaining.56
In Exel Technologies,57 the company claimed that "monthly communications meetings"
were held to discuss all matters relating to employment, including pay and non-pay terms
and conditions of employment, and were attended by elected staff representatives from
each department. Therefore, the employer submitted, this process was no different from
that which occurs in a company that engages with a trade union. SIPTU contended that the
monthly communications meeting system was under the control of the employer and,
consequently, employees had no appropriate means of processing claims with independent
representation, no means of appeal, and no opportunity to refer to third parties. The court
wvas satisfied that no details had been submitted by the employer to show that disputes
concerning terms and conditions of employment were normally or routinely dealt with
through this process. Consequently, the court found that the company's procedure was not
of the type envisaged by s. 2 (l)(a) of the Act.
In R ,anair,58 the company outlined a system (which it contended amounted to collective
bargaining) whereby employees, including pilots, elect employee representatives to
Employee Representative Committees (ERCs). The various ERCs then negotiate directly
with the company on an ongoing basis in relation to all terms and conditions of
employment. It was accepted that the Dublin pilot representatives had withdrawn from the
ERC in August 2004 and no new representatives had been appointed. The court found that
the ERCs were established by Ryanair and that the company had organised and controlled
the election of employee representatives to them, including specifying the criteria of
eligibility for election (e.g. no representative could serve more than one term). Employees
were informed of the outcome of ERC discussions by Ryanair in a newsletter which it
published and in respect of which it retained copyright. As a result (and b' reference also
to company documents) the Labour Court found that collective bargaining did not take
place within the company.
The Labour Court \xviii now have to rethink its underlying approach in the light of the
Supreme Court decision. While the latter, significantly, did not set down precise rules or
offer guidelines for the operation of a non-union internal bargaining unit, it seems from the
5S 12071 4 1R 70, at p. 75.
56 In addition to the examples discussed in d text, sec bltie Rasicl Cr ,che (Case I,('R18648 issued in
24/07/2006) and Ashlbrd Gstle (Case DE( '032 issued on 19/11/2003).
57 .'se I CRI8274 issued on 25/07/2005 .
58 ( asc DIF(CP051 issued on 25/1 1 2 io;
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judgment that employers would be free to determine the form, structure and organisation
of any internal collective bargaining units, as long as these have a degree of permanency and
are not ad hoc. Thus, if an employer were to set up such a unit, it could presumably decide
on issues such as how employees would be elected or chosen to be members, the remit of
the unit, the terms of office of its members, and the rules and procedures of its operation. 59
Disquiet has been expressed that the Supreme Court's definition of collective bargaining
tends to ignore not only Ireland's industrial relations traditions, but also ILO Conventions
and Declarations to which Ireland is a signator; 60 Ireland has ratified a number of ILO
instruments, which explicitly require that the framework within which collective bargaining
must take place if it is to be table and effective be based on the principles of the
independence and autonomy of the parties and the free and voluntary nature of the
negotiations.61 Furthermore, ILO principles require that all legislation establishing
machinery and procedures for arbitration and conciliation designed to facilitate bargaining
between both sides of industry should guarantee the autonomy of parties to collective
bargaining; explicitly excluded is the notion of employer-dominated bodies or company
unions being considered as mechanisms for collective bargaining.62
Moreover, in addition to its international law obligations, there must be a real concern
as to the compatibility of the Irish position with Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which guarantees the "right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements" With
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the Charter has attained the
status of primary EU law.63 The provisions of the Charter, according to Title VII, are
addressed to the institutions and bodies of the EU with due regard for the principle of
subsidiarity and to the member states only \when they are implementing EU laxv. However,
there is an obligation on Community Institutions and Member States to promote the rights in
the Charter. Finall, given that Ireland has now incorporated into domestic law the F(CHR, 64
there is an obligation on the Irish Courts to interpret and apply any statutory provision on
rule of law in a manner that is compatible with the country's obligations under the
Convention. 65 In this respect, it is important to note the recent decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in Demir and Baikara v Turke 66 \where the court declared that
.\rticle 11 of the ECHR includes a right to bargain collectively and precludes a blanket ban
on a right to strike.
67
There must be a real concern, therefore, that the Supreme Court, by not indicating
more precisely what a non-union internal bargaining unit would look like, opens the
possibility that employers will set up units that may not be genuine bargaining fora and thus
59 Dohertv, "Union sundown", n. 5 above-
60 D D',\rt and T Turner, "Ircland in breach ,f ILO convennons on freedom of association, claim academics"
(2(07) 11 IRN.
61 B (;ernigon et al., "ILO pnnciples concerning colectve bargaining" (20(10) 139 InternationalLabour Retriew 33.
62 Ibid. at p. 44.
63 New Art. 6 Treary on European Union.
64 BY virnue of the Fluropean ( ivention on Human Rights Act 2(003.
65 Ibid., ;. 2.
66 Application No 34503/97, 12 November 2008. See also Eneri Yapi-)Yl Sen v Tlrk' (Application \
(,8959/0l. 21 April 2009).
67 Rulings which potentially bnng the court's jurisprudence into conflict with that of the EC.I.
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abuse the process. At the very least, it seems, legislative intervention will be required.
68
Most likely this will require a statutory definition of "collective bargaining" The ILO
defines collective bargaining as:
all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of employers or
one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more
workers' organisations, on the other, for-
(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or
(b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or
(c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a workers'
organisation or workers' organisations.69
Where national law or practice recognises the existence of other forms of workers'
representatives, national law or practice can determine the extent to which the term
collective bargaining shall also extend to negotiations with these representatives.70 Thus,
although ILO definitions emphasise the role of trade unions in collective bargaining, they do
recognise the potential role of non-union representatives. Crucially, however, they also insist
that such representatives (and bargaining units) must be genuinely independent of employers.
It can be argued that worker representatives (whether elected or appointed) who are
employees of the undertaking, and therefore dependent on the goodwill of management
for their employment and prospects of promotion, can never be genuinely independent. 7 1
However, at a minimum, Irish legislation could be amended to, first, lay down conditions to
be met regarding the establishment and operation of internal non-union bargaining units.72
Secondly, and in contrast to the Supreme Court's view, it might be provided that collective
bargaining could not take place in a context where an employer refuses to engage with the
trade union or excepted body which employees indicate (by way, perhaps, of ballot or
independent verification) they wish to represent them.
The effects of the Supreme Court's decision can already be clearly seen. First, as noted
above, the number of claims pursued under the Act has dropped dramatically and many
union officials have proclaimed the Acts effectively dead. Secondh, the decision in Bell
Secnri 73 illustrates the new approach taken by the Labour Court. Here, two employees gave
oral evidence to the court in support of the union's claim (both were union shop stewards).
The Labour Court found that a trade dispute was in existence. It further found that the
internal dispute resolution procedures had been exhausted. However, on the facts of the
case the court decided that it was the company's practice to engage in collective bargaining
with employees. The Labour Court's concluding remarks are worth quoting at this point:
68 One option would be to go down the UK route of statutory union recognition; this approach, though, would
be strongly resisted by employer groups and does not seem to be favoured by the government;J Lavelle et al.,
"Unions on the edge? Industrial relations in multinational companies" in T Hastings (ed.), The State of the
Unions (Dublin: Liffe Press 2008).
69 Art. 2 of ILO Convention (154) concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining (1981).
70 The ILO defines non-union worker representatives as "elected representatives, namel', reprcsentatves who
ire ieih elected by the workers of the undertaking in accordance with provisions of national laws or
regulations or of collective agreements and whose functions do not include acivities which are recognised as
the exclusive prerogative of trade unions in the country concerned"- Art. 3 of the Convention Concerning
Protection and Facilities to be Afforded to \\Wirkers' Representatives in the Undertaking (1971).
71 D'Art and Turner, "Ireland in breach", .. 60.
72 A template of sorts can be f ound in Sched. 2 of the Employee (Provision of information and C, nsultinron)
Act 2006, which lays down the standard rules for the establishment of an employee information and
consultation forum.
73 Case 1(CR19188 issued on 11/{04/2008.
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The Court accepts the union's submission that on the facts of this case there was
an inherent and manifest inequality of negotiating capacity between the
employee and management representatives. A professional HR specialist and
senior managers represented the Company. Electricians who had no training or
skills in negotiation or bargaining represented the employees. It is clear on the
evidence that because of this the employee representatives came to see their role
as involving little more than carrying messages back and forth and considered the
process to be a waste of time and going nowhere.
It is nonetheless clear on the evidence that there was a practice whereby
representatives of the employees, including representatives of the Dublin
engineers, sat around a table with representatives of the Company with a view to
reaching agreement if possible. That is collective bargaining negotiations for the
purpose of the Act.
If the Court were considering the factual matrix of this case in an industrial
relations context it might take a different view. However it must apply the law as
it finds it and following the decision in Ryanair there can be no doubt as to the
correct legal approach to the questions arising in this case.
Thus, the court accepted that the Supreme Court decision requires it to take an
approach outside of the "industrial relations context" Of course, the court's unease with
this, as well as its comments on the inequality of firepower between the parties, should be
noted with concern. However, it does seem that it is the definition of "collective
bargaining" that is key here. The union quoted both ILO and dictionary definitions.
Legislative movement on this issue in line with these may well, therefore, have the effect of
resuscitating the Acts.
An "Irish model" for representation rights?
The study did not seek to investigate in depth the extent to which union claims were
successful or unsuccessful under the legislation. However, a number of points are
noteworthy in terms of the Recommendations made by the Labour Court. This section will
assess some of the key impacts of the legislation, focusing particularly on the extent to
which the acts plugged the "representation gap" that exists where employers refuse to
recognise employees' union(s). Moreover, potential implications of this "Irish model" for
IR practice elsewhere are considered.
MANDATING THE "MODEL EMPLOYER" - AN IRISH APPROACH TO THE "LAVAL QUESTION"?
In 34 of the 48 cases looked at in depth, the Labour Court made a Recommendation on
remuneration. Two types of Recommendation are noteworthy. First, in eight of the cases,
the court felt the company should pay the terms of the nationalpay agreement in place at the
time. For example, in Creagh Transport,74 it was established that the company had no fLxed
or formal system of reviewing the pay of its employees. The company claimed that, due to
the econotmic and commercial circumstances of the business, it had been unable to pay any
increases for over four years. The Labour Court was of the view that the company's failurc
to provide for any increases in pay over such an extended period could not be justified. The
court went on to say that, whilst the increases provided by national partnership agreements
were not an automatic statutory or contractual entitlement, in the absence of any other
established or agreed method of pay determination, they represented an -'appropriate
reference point" for establishing a fair and reasonable level of pay adjustment. The court
rejected the submission that it was precluded from recommending increases in line with
74 Case LCR17933 issued on 18/)8'20(14.
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those provided by national agreements as any recommendation made by the court to that
effect could be implemented without the necessity for collective bargaining at the level of the
enterprise. The court recommended that, in future, pay should be adjusted by reference to
the increases provided by national agreements subject to the right of the company to plead
inability to pay through the mechanisms provided by those agreements.
Secondly, in 18 cases where a Recommendation on remuneration was made, this was on
the basis of pay norms in the given industry.75 In Bank of Ireland,76 the court pointed out:
The powers which are given to the Court by the Act are a far reaching departure
from the normal approach to the resolution of industrial relations disputes. They
provided, in effect, that the Court may arbitrate in a dispute on the unilateral
application of one party and in circumstances where the other parry may not
consent to the process. It seems to the Court that, having regard to the voluntary
nature of our industrial relations system, such an intervention is only appropriate
where it is necessary in order to provide protection to workers whose terms and
conditions of employment, when viewed in their totality, are significantl out of
line with appropriate standards.
Thus, the court, in its Recommendations on pay, has sought to introduce the idea of the
"model employer"; in other wvords, it has effectively benchmarked respondent companies
against others in the sector. This can be seen in Fournier Laboratories,77 where the Court
found that the company's pay determination system was out of line with accepted standards
in that it was based solely on performance assessment, rather than by reference to a basic
"rate for the job", the predominant practice in the sector. Similarly, in Cooley Disillen,,78 the
court accepted pay rates agreed by the union (through collective bargaining) with other
employers both locally and nationally as indicative of the industry norm. It recommended
the respondent increase its pay rates to this more "'appropriate standard". 79
Therefore, where companies fall below the general, prevailing industry standards (as
located by the court) they have been told to raise standards to that level (frequently
identified as those set down by national pay agreements). From an emplo yer's point of vie\,
this can be seen as unwarranted interference with the right to operate a business and with
property rights (as it effectively forces up industry norms in terms of pay). Furthermore,
using the "unionised" standard of national agreements seems to threaten the right
(recognised in Ryanair) to operate a non-union company. This most likely feeds into the
Supreme Court's criticism of the Labour Court's "union mindset"
However, it has been frequenty suggested (although cvidence is somewhat sketch) 811
that in many industries the national agreements do act as a benchmark for non-union firms.
In addition, in pay claims before the Labour Court under any legislation, the national
agreements are arguably a useful benchmark to use. The alternative is for the court to
75 S'e, for example, Galway Clinic (Case LCR18815 issued on 18/01/2007).
76 Case LCR7745 issued on 28/01/20U4.
77 Case LCR 18;82 issued on 24, 0,'2006. This decision of the [.about Court was quashed by way of a consent
order, ftllosing the insttuion of Judicial Review proceedings, made by the High Co urt on 13 November
2(717
78 (.ise LCR17908 issued on 19/07/2004.
79 In terle Technologies (Cac I.CRI-906 issued ,,n 19/(7/2004), the curt, in holding pay rates were ,iot out of
hne with industry norms, took account of the emplos cr', ,nision of rccenti publibcd survey infrmarion
on comparable rates of p.i compiled by the IBFC and the CSO. 'the court al- noted that no industry
cimparaitrs \% ere put forward by the union.
80 Cf. 1) G (ollings et al., "Between B,, ton and Berlin: ,\mencan . n\s od the shufting cotour,,t industrimal
relations in Ircland" t2008) 10 1 2 1 ter,'W d Io',1our',al f I IR\ 242.
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depend on the parties' submissions on local and sectoral pay comparators. In such cases,
both sides will have clear agendas, which can distort the true picture, information of this
nature may be difficult to obtain and partial, and there are concerns about confidentiality.
Furthermore, intervention in companies' wage-setting is nothing new; all employers are
bound by the national minimum wage and some industries are subject to levels of pay set
by Joint Industrial Councils (JICs) and Joint Labour Committees (JLCs).81 Clearly; though,
there is a distinction between legally binding minimum standards and the setting of an
industry wide "fair rate for the job' (particularly where the latter is set, not by the parties
themselves in collective agreements, but by a state industrial relations tribunal).
It is this issue of binding minimum standards, as distinct from collectively agreed norms,
that has been at the heart of controversial recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions
on collective rights. In a series of cases, Lava, I 'iking, Ruai and Lxembourg,8 2 the ECJ has
severely affected the rights of trade unions and member states to protect collective
agreements in cases where the rights of free movement of services or establishment are
involved. The court ruled in Lava! that, in accordance with the free movement of services
provisions of the EC Treaty and the terms of the Posted Workers Directive (PWD),8 3
Swedish trade unions could not take industrial action to compel a Latvian builder operating
in Stockholm, and "posting" Latvian workers there, to observe the terms and conditions of
collective agreements operating in Sweden. Similarly, in Riuffert a Polish contractor could not
be compelled to observe collective agreements that were locally, but not nationally,
applicable and in Lulxembourg posting employers could not be forced to observe collectively
agreed minimum terms and conditions of employment beyond the mandatory matters
listed in Article 3 of the PWD. At the heart of all these rulings is the view that where
collective agreements are not declared universally applicable, extended erga omnes to non-
union workplaces, or their provisions protected, in some war, by member state legislation,
they cannot be imposed on service providers from other EU jurisdictions operating in the
member state in question.84 All that can be required of such service providers is that the),
observe statutory minima terms and conditions of employment.
In this respect, the Irish legislation, ironically, given that it falls short of union demands
for strengthened collective bargaining rights, might offer a mechanism to protect
"prevailing rates", rather than minimum standards, that would withstand ECJ scrutiny. In
terms of fairness and social equit3, the Labour Court approach, in attempting to benchmark
and mandate good practice, has much to commend it. The court, after all, is explicitly set
81 See Parts IV and V of the Indusmal Relations Act 1946. JLCs provide for the fixing of legally binding
minimum rates of pay and the regulation of employment in certain sectors where there is little or no collective
bargaining and where significant numbers of vulnerable workers are employed (e.g. the hotels sector).
Collective agreements made by JICs (voluntary negotiating bodies for an industry or part of an industry,
designed to facilitate collective bargaining at industry level in certain sectors) are also reistcrcd with the
Labour Court and are legally binding. They generally exist in sectors with a relatively high level of unionisation
(e.g- the construction sector). The Industrial Relations Amendment Bill 2009 (just published at the time of
writing) seeks to strengthen both mechanisms.
82 Case C-341/05 Lu,! v Srenska Bj'ggnadsarbetareilrbundet 120071 ECR 1-11767; Case 1-438/(15 Internahonal
Transport llwkxrs' Federalion and Finish Searneni Union % I 'iking Line -18P 12008] IRLR 14: Case (-346/06
Rd/ffert v Land N\edersasen 12008] IRLR 467: and Case C 319/06 European Convirssion v L'vembonrg 12l 01
IRLR 388.
83 Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 4i workers in the framework of the
provision of services 0 LI8/01.
84 Sec S Deakin, "The labour law perspective: the economic implications of the decisions" (21i17-08) 10 ( 'El.,
463: C Barnard, "I 'kin and Larah a single market perspectivc" in K Ewing and J Fiend- (eds), Tie New Spectre
Hantn.g Enrope - The ECJ, trade union ,ghts and the Brnti.gorernrnent (ILiverpool: Institute of Emplo ment Rights
'0(09); ,\ C L Davies, "One step forward. two steps back? The I iking and Ln/Cases in the EI" (''200, 1 27(2)
Industnil LawJournral 126.
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up to reflect and accommodate the different, often conflicting, interests of labour and
business in the interest of employment relations harmony. However, it has been
persuasively argued 85 that the Irish judiciary in a number of major areas of constitutional
interpretation frequently tends to defer to individual values, and particularly individual
property rights, over those of the community or collective groups. This approach of the
Superior Courts is, perhaps, visible again in the Ryanair decision. It would require a
legislative (or Supreme Court) rethinking of what "bargaining" entails in the Irish context
(in line with ILO and ECHR formulations) for the Acts to truly offer a way out of the Laval
dilemma. We will return to this question in the concluding section.
A Trojan horse? Union recognition under the Acts
A key concern of employers has been that the Acts effectively promote a form of "back
door" union recognition; that essentially the Acts allow unions to get their "foot in the
door" and force employers to deal with them on some level. 86 Undoubtedly, the unions
hoped that this would be the case. It should be noted, however, that in only two cases,
Federal Security, Services Lta8 7 and Hillview N\ursting Home88 did employers actually concede
bargaining recognition to a union (and in both cases, the employer decided to recognise
unions other than those taking the respective claims). Therefore, neither the fears of
employers nor the hopes of the unions seem to be borne out empirically.
Nevertheless, the Acts have had some interesting effects worthy of comment. In a
limited number of rulings, the Labour Court seemed to indicate that, on certain issues,
unions and their members should have a collective influence. This can be seen in Caring/ord
Nursig Home89 where it was recommended that the company put m place a new harassment
and equal treatment policy. In drawing this up, the union (SIPTU) xas to be permitted to
make submissions on the content of such policies and these submissions were to be taken
into account. More starkly, perhaps, in the long-running saga involving Asford Castle90 the
company (while not conceding union recognition) eventually indicated to the Court that it
would be prepared to facilitate the union in providing paid training for its shop stewards,
who could then represent members in grievance procedures.
Most worryingly of all for non-union employers is the case of Esker Lodge nursing
home, where it was reported that the Irish Business and Employers' Confederation (IBEC)
may have advised the company to recognise the union on pragmatic grounds; that is, that it
would be easier to simply concede recognition than to become caught up in the procedure
under the Acts.91 It should be stressed, though, that there seems little further evidence of
cases where unions have been able to use the spectre of the Acts to persuade employers to
engage directly in a traditional collective bargaining relationship.
In this respect, the Acts throw up an intriguing dilemma for unions. Taking claims
under the Acts involves considerable time and expense. Often claims are taken on behalf
of non-members, and frequently in respect of small groups of workers. Although unions
may have been willing to pursue these claims initially in an attempt to demonstrate the
85 G Morgan, A Judgnent Too dr?Jidicial a,-tlrisnl and tl1e Consflition (Cork: (, irk U P 2001). in relation t, trade
union rights, see p. 38ff.
86 See, for example, T Dobbins, "Union recognition law ued for benchmarking private scctor pay" 211)5)
16 IR\.
87 See n. 27 above.
88 C.isc I ,CR18440 issued on 22,12, 2005.
S') (ase II R17932 Issued on 17/08/2014
90 Ca,. 1CR18820 issued on 22/01 21r.
9 1 T Dobbins, -leir" of 2(114 Act persuades nursintg home to concede full reoignition" (20106) 36 IR'.
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value of union representation to non-union workforces, the sustainability of such a
strategy is questionable. It certainly is not a traditional form of union representation nor
does it fit within many of the prescriptions offered to halt union decline in the literature
on union "revitalisation". 92
Furthermore, the fact that the legislation explicitly excludes Recommendations on
collective bargaining and empowers the court to deal only with specific, defined issues,
means that unions may face the prospect of being forced to take multiple claims against a
particular employer. The study showed that 89 different employers featured in the 103
hearings, but some employers featured in multiple hearings; Ashford Castle, for example,
was involved in four separate hearings.93 Again, this type of action probably involves an
unsustainable commitment of union time and resources. Clearly, the unions will take such
cases in order to try and persuade employers to recognise them in a traditional bargaining
relationship. Where employers refuse, however, multiple claims seem to be the only option
under the legislation. Outside of the impacts on unions and employers (who will have the
threat of Labour Court imposed pay and conditions hanging over them), there are
important public policy considerations here also, not least the implications in terms of the
growing demands on the time and resources of the LRC and the Labour Court.
A final issue needs to be addressed here in relation to union recognition. As noted
above, one of the key objections to any attempts to introduce a statutory recognition
procedure (along the lines of the UK) has been the alleged threat this would pose to foreign
direct investment (primarily from US MNCs) on which the Irish economy is so dependent.
Similar concerns have been voiced about the impact of the 2001-2014 Acts on MNC
activity in Ireland. 94 In this regard, it should be noted that the study reveals the majority of
cases involved indigenous employers (72 per cent). Although the number of cases involving
MNCs is perhaps higher than had been previously thought, 95 the main impact of the
legislation, as we have seen, has been on employers whose pay and conditions fall below the
industry norm. The larger, "flagship" MNCs, where HR practices would generally be
relatively sophisticated and where pay and conditions of employment would generally be at
the higher end of the spectrum, barely feature at all. 96 Thus, the focus on the "threat to
investment" argument seems to be misplaced.
Conclusion
This article considered the operation of the 2001-2004 right to bargain legislation in the
light of the seminal Supreme Court decision in the Ryanair case. Throughout, the concern
was to identiti; first, whether the legislation has any future role to play and, secondly, to
consider the impacts of the Acts and the Ryanair decision on the various IR stakeholders
for whom the rights (or lack thereof) to union representation is of paramount concern. On
the first issue, various suggestions were made that could have the effect of "resuscitating"
the legislation, in particular a re-formulation of the definition of "collective bargaining".
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92 C Frege and J Kelly, Union Revitalisation Strategies in Comparative Perspective (Sage: London 2003).
93 Case DECP032 issued on 19/11/2003: Case LCR17760 issued on 23/03/204. Case LCR17914 issued on
22/07/2004. and Case LCRI88220 issued on 22/01/2007; as well as a High Court hearing: 120071 4 IR 70.
94 See n. 6 above.
95 Sheehan, "Employers", ,. 15 above.
96 And, for example, in GE Healthcare (Case LCRI8013 issued on 221 H/2004) SIPTU's pay claim was rcjccted
by the court as employees had actualh" received pay increases in cxcess of the national pay deals.
97 See also E Gilvarry and B Hunt, "Trade union recognition and the Labour Court: picking up the pieces .atcr
Ryanai?' in T Hastings (ed.), The State qf the Unions (Dublin: liffev Pr ess 208)
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On the second issue, there must be a real concern that Irish law remains unique in the
Western world in not offering legally guaranteed rights to union representation.
However, the innovative nature of the legislation is worthy of some concluding
comments in the light of recent developments in other EU jurisdictions. First, it has been
noted that the UK, with a similar voluntarist tradition to Ireland (albeit without the
corporatist tendencies evident in the social partnership era), introduced a mandatory union
recognition law under the 1999 Employment Relations Act. The legislation has certainly not
been an unqualified success from the point of view of bolstering collective bargaining
there, as, while there has been a sharp decline in the derecognition of unions, concerns have
been expressed that recognition has been primarily achieved in "core" union constituencies
(where existing membership levels are relatively high); that the scope of collective
bargaining is relatively restricted and more often represents consultative, rather than joint,
regulation; and that the delays and costs of organising recognition ballots frustrate efforts
to recruit and retain members.98 Recognition laws, clearly, are not a panacea for union ills.
99
Secondly, we have discussed above the impact of recent ECJ decisions regarding the
interaction between economic rights and the right to uphold collective agreements. The
ECJ has effectively made voluntary collective agreements that require service providers to
comply with terms and conditions that go beyond statutory minima impossible to enforce
against providers from other EU jurisdictions. The Irish legislation and the Labour
Court's operation thereof, at least before its emasculation in the Ryanair case, did provide
an opportunity for prevailing norms in an industry or (through voluntary national pay
deals) the economy as a whole to be enforced, e/en where these exceeded statutory
minimum standards. Where legal protection for collective bargaining rights under EU law
appears to be under threat, it may be that the Irish approach offers an alternative model
worthy of exploration.
98 Sec, for example, R Dukes, "The statutory recognition procedure 1999: no bias in favour of recomition?"
(2I08) 37(2) ndtistrina/La Jornal 236; \\ Brown and D Nash, "What has been happening to collecnve
,irgainig under New labour interpretng \\ IRS 20014" (2008) 39(2) Indusa/ Relations Journal 91.
B Mc,\rthur, "The efficacy of statutory union reco~niion under Ncu Labour: a comparatvc rc\ ie " (21)4i
21)(3) In/ernational Journaloj Comuparaltre Libour Liwanu lndiunta/ Re/ahons 399; and S iixenbndge ct al., "Ininal
icsponses to the statutory ecognition provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1909- (2103) 41(2) Bntsh
./ortal oj lnduana/ Relaios 315.
99 .\s Kahn-Freund put it "a healthy union movement can rake a 'rear deal oif legal intcrentrin whilst weak
union miav Ie its v'ictim'; Labour and the Liu-, n. 49 aboe., 
at p. 121.
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